## Courts

**A2 Perm: Do Both---Politics**

**“Perm: Do both” links to politics – Politically unpopular court decisions allow politicians to posture in opposition to the Court’s ruling—the perm fiats away this ability to politically profit from the CP---means only the CP preserves PC\*\*\***

Whittington 7 Keith E. Whittington, politics at Princeton University, 2007 (Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy, p. 137-39)

Independent and active judicial review generates position-taking opportunities by reducing the policy responsibility of the elected officials. They may vote in favor of a bill that they personally dislike secure in the knowledge that it will never be implemented. State statutes regulating abortion after the *Roe* decision, for example, were often pure symbolism, though they could also play a more productive role in pressing the Court to refine its doctrine or in filling in the lacuna left by judicial decisions. More subtly, the judicial backstop allows legislators to focus on some dimensions of the proposed policy (the most optimistic and politically popular) while downplaying others (the constitutionally subversive and treacherous). Legislators even gain a political windfall when the courts actually act to strike down the popular law. The visibility of the exercise of judicial review creates another opportunity for legislators to publicize their position on the issue, this time by bewailing the Court’s actions. ¶ [continues]¶ On the other hand, by allowing elected politicians to shift political blame to judges for unpopular actions judicial review may also stiffen the spine of politicians to act on their central ideological commitments. As we saw in chapter 2, for example, the Court’s decisions on abortion allowed some politicians, such as Jimmy Carter, to try to have it both ways with voters, by simultaneously proclaiming their pro-life private opinions and their judicially imposed pro-choice public responsibilities. Similarly, as the first Catholic president, John F. Kennedy was acutely conscious of the need to demonstrate his independence from the church while still holding the political support of his fellow Catholics. Before and during his campaign for the presidency, Kennedy emphasized how the Constitution, and the Court’s interpretation of it, tied the hands of individual officeholders---to the consternation of religious critics who found him “spiritually rootless and politically almost disturbingly secular.” The Constitution and all its parts---including the First Amendment and the strict separation of church and state,” he avowed, necessarily trumped “one’s religion in private life.” For example, “the First Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court” left no question of federal funds being used for support of parochial or private schools.” In office he bristled at criticism fro Catholic officials of his proposal for federal aid to public schools but not private schools, criticisms that he did not recall being made during the Eisenhower administration. Though he was “extremely sympathetic” to the financial burdens borne by families sending children to parochial school, a close “reading [of] the cases” raised “serious constitution questions” that the president could not be expected to ignore. “It is prohibited by the Constitution, and the Supreme Court has made that very clear.” ¶ Regardless of whether legislators would be more constitutionally responsible if judicial review did not exist, they can certainly recognize the political opportunities created by the empirical reality of judicial review. The consequence is that the actual exercise of judicial review may not be as unwelcome and hostile to congressional interests as is often assumed, and affiliated leaders have further reason to support the judicial authority to determine congressional meaning. Some legislative votes are “politically compelling,” in that “legislators feel compelled to support certain policy options because their intended effects are popular, irrespective of whether the proposed means will really achieve those ends” or are even necessary. Once a bill that professes to stop violence against women, keep guns out of schools, protect the flag from desecration, or prevent child pornography reaches the floor, legislatures are “practically forced to support it.” Although legislators may harbor doubts about the policy and constitutional wisdom of such proposals, clear electoral imperatives are likely to drive legislative decision-making. Enhancing the judicial authority to define and enforce constitutional meaning can ease the legislative policy conscience, while allowing legislators to reap the electoral gains of position taking**.**

**Links to politics – Only PRIOR court action solves**

**Garrett and Stutz, 2005** (Robert T. Garrett and Terrence Stutz, Dallas Morning News, “School finance now up to court Justices to decide if overhaul needed after bills fail in Legislature” lexis)

That could foreshadow the court's response to a chief argument by state attorneys – that the court should butt out and leave school finance to the Legislature. A court finding against the state would put the ball back in the hands of lawmakers, who have tended to put off dealing with problems in schools, prisons and mental health facilities until state or federal judges forced them to act. "It's the classic political response to problems they don't want to deal with," said Maurice Dyson, a school finance expert and assistant law professor at Southern Methodist University. "There is **no better political cover** than to have a court rule that something must be done, which allows politicians to say their hands are tied."

### A2 Perception/Biz Con/Predictability/Law on Books

#### This is silly – the CP sends the same signal by having the Supreme Court invalidate restrictions – nobody knows about fiat in a world of the aff which means businesses perceive the plan to be just as unpredictable – our politics links prove this is ONLY a DA to the PLAN

Kemp ’12 (John, “Obama’s confused energy policy”, March 26, <http://business.financialpost.com/2012/03/26/obamas-confused-energy-policy/>, CMR)

U.S. President Barack Obama has discovered too late that symbols matter. His administration is trying and mostly failing to reverse the impression that it is hostile to fossil fuels such as oil, gas and coal after the president’s peremptory and opportunistic decision to block the Keystone XL pipeline in January. In a string of speeches, beginning with the State of the Union, the president has articulated a carefully scripted “all of the above” strategy which embraces clean energy from wind and solar, improvements in energy efficiency, and an increase in domestic hydrocarbon production – especially clean-burning gas but also oil from shale. It is all part of a complicated balancing act that aims to mollify his environmental base, ease fears about the rising gasoline prices and neutralise opposition from the oil industry and congressional Republicans, angered by continued restrictions on drilling and pipelines, who are seeking to exploit rising oil prices to hurt the president ahead of November’s election. PIPELINE DREAMS So far the president has struggled to sound convincing. Obama cannot shake off the impression the administration’s enthusiasm for clean tech is matched by an only grudging acceptance of the need to develop more fossil fuel resources. So in a bold move, the White House last week stuck the president in a pipe yard in front of a stack of oil pipes ready to be laid at the industry’s spiritual home of Cushing, Oklahoma, to reiterate its commitment to the fossil fuel component of “all of the above”. Politicians pick backdrops carefully (remember George W. Bush and his “mission accomplished” banner on the USS Abraham Lincoln in 2003). So this was the most pointed way the White House could associate the president with expansion of domestic oil and gas, imply he is not anti-oil and suggest he is keen to promote “shovel ready” jobs in pipeline construction. The charitable interpretation is that the president is charting a middle way between environmentalists staunchly opposed to fossil fuel development because of its global warming potential, and the “drill baby drill” enthusiasts of the oil industry and right-wing talk radio. “Having pleased environmentalists in January, Mr Obama can now embrace Oklahoma oilmen with a straight face,” Gregory Meyer wrote in the Financial Times last week. The less charitable interpretation is that the president has alienated everyone by performing a series of tergiversations and is struggling to integrate the disparate elements of his energy policy into a coherent whole. The White House took care to balance the trip to the pipe yard and a New Mexico oil field (very old dirty energy) with visits to a solar project in Nevada (nice clean energy) and the centre for automotive research in Ohio (ditto). The president has stressed his support for the southern leg of the Keystone pipeline (from Cushing to the Gulf) while defending his decision to block the northern leg (from the Canadian border via Nebraska), insisting there was just not time to evaluate the impact on Ogallala aquifer, and hinting but not quite promising his administration would look favourably on another application once more studies have been done and the election is out of the way. ALIENATING EVERYONE Whether anyone is convinced is doubtful. The Natural Resources Defence Council (NRDC), one of the country’s largest and most powerful environmental lobbies, is certainly not enthusiastic. NRDC President Frances Beinecke immediately responded to the president’s embrace of pipelines with a blog entitled “All of the Above Can’t Deliver All the Benefits the Clean Energy Economy Can”. “Instead of offering targeted policies, many leaders are suggesting an ”all of the above“ approach to energy development. The idea is that we should throw everything we have at the problem and see what sticks. It’s a misguided strategy that would do more harm than good,” wrote a clearly disappointed Beinecke. “It’s the equivalent of walking into a restaurant and ordering everything on the menu. Most people don’t do that in real life, because we know it costs too much and will make us sick. Instead we select the best food for the best price. We can do the same with energy. We can choose the best and bypass the rest.” Oil and gas producers are scarcely less enthusiastic, though there are some signs that the debate is moving in their direction, with heavy hints the administration will not block further drilling and pipelines. The White House will probably even approve the northern section of Keystone, eventually, once it no longer needs environmental votes. But planning long-lived capital intensive projects is hard when investors must struggle with a bewildering policy in which regulations covering everything from drilling to power plant emissions, nuclear permits and mountain top mining are proposed and withdrawn according to whether they are politically expedient. BIPARTISANSHIP? None of these problems is new. America’s energy policy has been severely dysfunctional for at least 40 years, driven by a mix of political concern about gasoline prices, lobbying for misguided deregulation of power markets at the behest of companies like Enron, and a guerrilla war of litigation fought by environmental groups against anything and everything (from nuclear to coal-fired and hydroelectric plants) spawning a giant environmental-legal complex. But the Obama administration has done nothing to provide leadership or try to impose coherence on energy issues. The president’s short-term approach to Keystone and emission controls has simply made matters worse. So there is a certain irony that Bill Richardson, energy secretary under the Clinton administration and a former governor of New Mexico, should lend his weight to Obama’s four-state energy tour with an editorial in the “Financial Times” calling for partisans to “Stop the politics and adopt a national energy plan” (March 22). “As energy secretary in the Clinton administration, I came to realise this country needs to promote all types of energy production. Mr Obama is right to put us on this course but the US Congress makes his mission challenging, if not impossible,” Richardson wrote. “There is plenty of rhetorical agreement about ”energy independence“ but when it comes to the specifics – pipelines, drilling, efficiency standards and renewable energy tax policies – consensus is elusive.” Indeed. According to Richardson, “The question for both Republicans and Democrats is whether such entrenched positions will prolong achievement of the ultimate goal that both sides agree on — energy independence and sustainable economic growth in the long term.” “There ought to be sufficient opportunities, given the vast resources that are available, to find common ground.” There is certainly no lack of interest in energy policy. Legislators in both houses of Congress have introduced more bills dealing with oil and gas issues in the current session (2011-2013) than at any time in at least 20 years. But actually achieving something will require compromise, on both sides. It will require congressional Republicans and coal-state Democrats to accept some of the regulatory agenda aimed at boosting fuel efficiency and cutting emissions. And it will require the president to face down some of the more extreme demands from green groups and end the thicket of guerrilla litigation around new energy projects. So far there is no sign whatsoever that either side is willing to make the necessary compromises. Both are having far too much fun treating energy policy as a political football. To go back to those photos, the president was proudly standing in front of tubes for a pipeline that currently has a section missing in the middle and won’t take oil anywhere. It is an apt metaphor for America’s broken energy policy.

#### Solves perception --- changes resource allocation

\*Also in AT Rollback

Treanor & Sperling 93 William - Prof Law at Fordham. Gene - Deputy Assistant to President for Economic Policy. “PROSPECTIVE OVERRULING AND THE REVIVAL OF "UNCONSTITUTIONAL" STATUTES,” Columbia Law Review, Dec 93, lexis

First, full examination of the revival issue demonstrates the interactive nature of the relationship between judicial invalidation of statutes and majoritarian decision-making. Judicial review is not purely external to the legislative process: the very act of judicial invalidation powerfully shapes subsequent legislative deliberations. Belief in the finality of judicial judgments is so pervasive that, when a statute is struck down or when a judicial decision establishes a rule of law under which a statute is unconstitutional, its opponents frequently act as if the statute were gone for all time**.** At the very least, even if political actors realize the potential for reversal, the finding of unconstitutionality alters the way in which they spend their political capital. As a result, rather than seek to repeal a statute that appears to be, for all practical purposes, a nullity, they devote their political resources to other - more clearly consequential - matters. Revival in such circumstances can produce a result contrary to what the political process would have produced in the absence of the initial judicial decision.

### A2 Perm: Do the CP

#### Counterplan is functionally and textually distinct – it doesn’t reduce the restriction, it just makes current US policy illegal, the policy still stays on the books, so the counterplan doesn’t reduce – that’s Treanor and Sperling –

#### It’s specific to when courts rule on restrictions

Treanor & Sperling 93 William - Prof Law at Fordham. Gene - Deputy Assistant to President for Economic Policy. “PROSPECTIVE OVERRULING AND THE REVIVAL OF "UNCONSTITUTIONAL" STATUTES,” Columbia Law Review, Dec 93, lexis

The Supreme Court's decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey n1 reshaped the law of abortion in this country. The Court overturned two of its previous decisions invalidating state restrictions on abortions, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists n2 and Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, n3 and it abandoned the trimester analytic framework established in Roe v. Wade. n4 At the time Casey was handed down, twenty states had restrictive abortion statutes on the books that were in conflict with Akron or Thornburgh and which were unenforced. n5 In six of these states, courts had held the statutes unconstitutional. n6 [\*1903] Almost as soon as the Casey ruling was announced, the campaign to secure enforcement of these restrictions began. n7

Are these statutes good law, despite the fact that they were once in conflict with governing Supreme Court precedent (and in some cases had been judicially determined to violate women's constitutional rights)? Alternatively, will they have to be re-enacted by the legislature to be enforceable? These questions highlight the revival issue. The revival issue arises when a court overrules a prior decision in which it had held a statute unconstitutional. (We will throughout this article refer to the first decision as the "invalidating decision," and to the second decision as the "overruling decision.") Should the enforceability of a statute passed prior to the overruling decision be determined by reference to the invalidating decision - in which case the statute would have to be repassed to be in effect - or by reference to the overruling decision - in which case the statute would not have to be repassed? In other words, does the overruling decision automatically revive a previously unenforceable statute? [\*1904]

The way in which the revival issue is resolved will thus determine whether, in light of Casey, previously unenforced statutes became enforceable without the need for any post-Casey legislative action. In addition to affecting what kind of abortion regulations are in effect in twenty states in the immediate wake of Casey, this determination has profound consequences for the kind of abortion regulations that will be in effect in these states in the future. Such long-term consequences reflect the fact that our governmental system is not one of pure majoritarianism and that the burden of inertia in our legislative process is heavy: as we will discuss, statutes on the books can stay on the books even if a current majority no longer desires them; in contrast, proposed statutes need supermajoritarian support to secure passage. n8 Therefore, the starting point for future legislative action - such as whether pre-Casey abortion regulations are enforceable - influences the legislative action that in fact develops.

The revival issue arose in perhaps its starkest form in the case of Weeks v. Connick. n9 In 1989, elected officials in Louisiana responded to the Supreme Court's decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services n10 by claiming that Roe had been effectively overruled and by seeking enforcement of a draconian 134-year-old law criminalizing abortion n11 which had previously been found unconstitutional under Roe. n12 The court in Weeks avoided confronting the revival issue by holding that the statute in question had been implicitly repealed. n13 As the Court's decision in Casey made clear, Webster did not overrule Roe, and the Court is unlikely to allow the enforcement of criminal abortion laws in the near future. But Louisiana's attempt to enforce its 1855 statute focused significant attention for the first time on the future status of the dozens of then-unconstitutional state abortion restrictions, as well as on the revival issue more generally. n14 [\*1905]

## Relations

### 2nc impact calc

#### Extend the Filger in 2009 evidence - Russian stability is uniquely intertwined with economic stability, deterioration of the economy will result instability, risking nuclear war – an economically weakened Russia would not be able to control its vast nuclear arsenal

#### And, instability risk nuclear war

Dimitri Simes, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “The Return of Russian History,” FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January/February 1994, p. 67+, LN.

For the United States, neither Yeltsin's political future nor even the future of Russian democracy should be ends in themselves. What the United States needs most in its greatly weakened but still potentially formidable superpower rival is a combination of domestic stability and a system of checks and balances. Stability is important for a nation with thousands of nuclear weapons and continuing territorial tensions with its newly independent neighbors. Too much disunity in Russia (as appealing as it is to those who "love" that country so much that they would prefer to see several Russias) increases the likelihood of a civil war that could easily engulf most, if not all, of the post-Soviet states, creating not only nuclear and environmental disasters but a grave threat to world peace as well. Thus, it is in the U.S. interest to have a government in Moscow that is strong and determined enough to draw the line and to prevent centrifugal, separatist trends from going out of control.

#### This is most probable scenario for nuclear war – will engulf the United States

Steven David, Professor of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University, “Saving America From the Coming Civil Wars,” FOREIGN AFFAIRS, v 78 n 1, Jan/Feb 1999, LN.

Only three countries, in fact, meet both criteria: Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and Russia. Civil conflict in Mexico would produce waves of disorder that would spill into the United States, endangering the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans, destroying a valuable export market, and sending a torrent of refugees northward. A rebellion in Saudi Arabia could destroy its ability to export oil, the oil on which the industrialized world depends. And internal war in Russia could devastate Europe and trigger the use of nuclear weapons. Of course, civil war in a cluster of other states could seriously harm American interests. These countries include Indonesia, Venezuela, the Philippines, Egypt, Turkey, Israel, and China. In none, however, are the stakes as high or the threat of war as imminent.

#### Error negative – internal conflict makes nuclear miscalculation inevitable – prefer this evidence – cites US intelligence studies and accounts for military policy

Pry 99 (Peter Vincent, Former US Intelligence Operative, War Scare: U.S.-Russia on the Nuclear Brink,

Russian internal troubles—such as a leadership crisis, coup, or civil war—could aggravate Russia’s fears of foreign aggression and lead to a miscalculation of U.S. intentions and to nuclear overreaction. While this may sound like a complicated and improbable chain of events, Russia’s story in the 1990s is one long series of domestic crises that have all too often been the source of nuclear close calls. The war scares of August 1991 and October 1993 arose out of coup attempts. The civil war in Chechnya caused a leadership crisis in Moscow, which contributed to the nuclear false alarm during Norway’s launch of a meteorological rocket in January 1995. Nuclear war arising from Russian domestic crises is a threat the West did not face, or at least faced to a much lesser extent, during the Cold War. The Russian military’s continued fixation on surprise-attack scenarios into the 1990s, combined with Russia’s deepening internal problems, has created a situation in which the United States might find itself the victim of a preemptive strike for no other reason than a war scare born of Russian domestic troubles. At least in nuclear confrontations of the 1950s–1970s—during the Berlin crisis, Cuban missile crisis, and 1973 Middle East war—both sides knew they were on the nuclear brink. There was opportunity to avoid conflict through negotiation or deescalation. The nuclear war scares of the 1980s and 1990s have been one-sided Russian affairs, with the West ignorant that it was in grave peril.

### 2nc UQ/link

#### Russia ramping up development – cuba key

Industry Press 3/2 “Will Russia Find Cuban oil?”

Many became highly concerned last week, when it was said that Russia was forgiving Cuba nearly $30 billion of debt. Journalists speculated that Russia had thus received access to the Cuban shelf which is quite promising, with a large resource base, but it has not been developed, so the work on the Cuban shelf bears certain risks for both Russian and other companies. Nevertheless it is beneficial for Russia to participate in the development of the Cuban shelf not just to increase oil production and sales, but also to receive additional technologies and experience on the shelf.¶ Assumptions of large reserves of black gold on the north coast of Cuba first appeared in 2008. Several companies started to explore the Cuban shelf: Venezuela’s PdVSA, Petronas of Malaysia, the Spanish Repsol, and the Russian Zarubezhneft. However, the results were bleak. Oil was not found, but Russia believed that it was early to give up.

#### Drilling is key to Cuban-Russian raproach – plan will infringe Russia

Voice from Russia July 2012 “Russia and Cuba: Old Friendships Never Wither”, http://02varvara.wordpress.com/tag/havana/

Russia and Cuba are strengthening their bilateral relations again after a break that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union supplied Cuba with oil, up to 13 million tons each year, and quantities of arms. In return, it received Cuban tobacco, coffee, fruit, and sugar and enjoyed the right to build and operate military facilities on Cuban territory. However, after the Soviet collapse these exchanges went downhill. The oil was cut off. In the early 90s, Russia shut its military training centre in Cuba. In 2002, it also closed its signals intelligence centre near the Cuban town of Lourdes, withdrawing all 1,000 personnel from the facility.¶ The millennium turn was the low point of the relationship. However, under Vladimir Putin, Russian-Cuban ties started to pick up again. In 2000, Putin visited Havana. In 2006, during a Havana visit by Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov, Cuba’s Soviet-era debts to Russia were finally settled, and Cuba received a 335 million dollar (11.925 billion Roubles. 275 million Euros. 215 million UK Pounds) Russian credit line, which allowed it to procure spare parts for some of its Soviet-made machinery and weaponry. In 2009, Cuban President Raúl Modesto Castro Ruz visited Moscow. This Wednesday, he arrived again, amid summertime heat, which he said reminded him of Havana. After discussing matters with Prime Minister Medvedev, he proceeded to the suburban dacha of President Putin.¶ President Putin said, “Some time ago, Russia and Cuba marked 110 years since they established diplomatic ties. These 110 years have seen ups and downs in relations, but at present, the relations are on the rise. Although pragmatic, they don’t negate the positive legacy of the past. We’re glad to welcome you. I do hope we’ll be able to review the entire spectrum of Russian-Cuban relations”. President Putin also used the occasion to extend his best wishes to veteran Cuban leader Fidel Alejandro Castro Ruz (President Castro’s elder brother).¶ President Castro said he was looking forward to a very productive Moscow visit, saying, “We live in a very complex and rapidly changing world. During my previous visit, we devoted time to the challenges faced by our countries in 2009. Today, we’re discussing the current situation. I’m always happy to meet with my old friends in the Russian capital. I expect my working visit to be very busy and highly productive”. After meeting with President Putin, Señor Castro shall meet with Nikolai Patrushev, the head of the Russian National Security Council.¶ Annual trade between Russia and Cuba already tops 220 million dollars (7.175 billion Roubles. 180 million Euros. 140 million UK Pounds) and continues to grow. Importantly, it isn’t limited to arms sales. Russia’s Gazpromneft is drilling for oil and gas in the Cuban sector of the Gulf of Mexico. Other Russian companies are helping Cuba develop electricity generation. Last year also saw a 30 percent increase in Russian tourist visits to Cuba. Russian holidaymakers on the island are rapidly catching up with European and Canadian ones.

### 2NC Influence = Zero-Sum

#### China-US sphere of influence is zero-sum

Drew Thompson ‘5, Assistant Director of the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. “China's Emerging Interests in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges for Africa and the United States,” African Renaissance Journal, July/August 2005, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/press/0508\_china\_african\_interests.pdf

Many foreign policy experts in the United States feel that one of the greatest challenges facing the U.S. in the 21 st century is “managing” the inevitable rise of China. While it is somewhat presumptuous to assume that the U.S. can “manage” China, it must endeavor to successfully integrate China into the global community and ensure that it respects international norms and continues to contribute to global economic growth as well as peace and stability. For the past 25 years, the process of integrating China into the global community has contributed to security and stability in the Asia Pacific region, substantially contributed to global wealth creation and transformed China from an inward-looking nation plagued by famine and internal political unrest into a dynamic, globalized country that increasingly shares mutual interests with other major powers. As China’s domestic economy grows, it is expanding and deepening political and economic relations in Africa, primarily to secure access to African markets and raw materials. There is rising concern among some in the United States that China’s growing influence in Africa is a zero-sum equation, whereby China’s rise will ultimately undermine U.S. interests in the region. China’s efforts to access African consumer markets and secure energy and raw materials to fuel its domestic economy are a legitimate interest and should be respected. However, China has placed little emphasis in its relations with African partners on improving governance and building sustainable economies, heightening U.S. concerns that China’s deepening relationships undermine international strategies to reduce poverty, foster stable economies and promote good governance. How the U.S. engages China in this effort (and how China responds) will be critical to Africa’s future. The U.S. and China share the fundamental goal of global peace, stability and sustainable economic growth, though there are certainly some differences in both nations’ strategies, such as the U.S. policy of promoting human rights and democracy. However, by recognizing common goals and reconciling divergent approaches, both nations have the opportunity to achieve significant progress towards realizing their common goals by building sound relations with African nations. China’s oft repeated aspiration to be a “responsible power” is cause for optimism that they are willing and able to cooperate with the international community to help promote sustained security and stability in Africa. This paper will explore China’s interests in African cooperation, some consequences of closer cooperation and growing economic links, and the implications for China’s growing influence for the United States. China’s Interests in African Cooperation China’s growing presence in Africa represents an effort to create a paradigm of globalization that favors China. Historically, China has long sought to portray itself as the leader of the Third World, cultivating relations with African nations by providing aid, technical expertise and diplomatic support in multilateral institutions to better position itself in a more multi-polar post-cold war environment. As a strategic partner, China is attractive to many African countries. As a former colony of European powers, China hopes that African people can favorably relate to China, which portrays itself as sensitive to other countries’ dignity. China’s professed respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs is appealing to many African leaders, some of whom face internal rebellions and ethnic unrest much as China does. China’s interests in Africa have shifted over the past fifty years from a desire to be the leader of the Third World during the cold war to expanding its political spheres of influence and ensuring access to export markets for Chinese manufactured goods and securing supplies of energy and raw materials through diplomacy, investment, aid and trade.

### 2NC China War

#### Pursuit of Asian influence causes war with China and Asian instability- forces Chinese expansionism to deter the US

Zenko and Cohen 12 (MICAH ZENKO is a Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. MICHAEL A. COHEN is a Fellow at the Century Foundation, Clear and Present Safety: The United States Is More Secure Than Washington Thinks, Foreign Affairs, lexis, CMR)

As the threat from transnational terrorist groups dwindles, the United States also faces few risks from other states. China is the most obvious potential rival to the United States, and there is little doubt that China's rise will pose a challenge to U.S. economic interests. Moreover, there is an unresolved debate among Chinese political and military leaders about China's proper global role, and the lack of transparency from China's senior leadership about its long-term foreign policy objectives is a cause for concern. However, the present security threat to the U.S. mainland is practically nonexistent and will remain so. Even as China tries to modernize its military, its defense spending is still approximately one-ninth that of the United States. In 2012, the Pentagon will spend roughly as much on military research and development alone as China will spend on its entire military. While China clumsily flexes its muscles in the Far East by threatening to deny access to disputed maritime resources, a recent Pentagon report noted that China's military ambitions remain dominated by "regional contingencies" and that the People's Liberation Army has made little progress in developing capabilities that "extend global reach or power projection." In the coming years, China will enlarge its regional role, but this growth will only threaten U.S. interests if Washington attempts to dominate East Asia and fails to consider China's legitimate regional interests. It is true that China's neighbors sometimes fear that China will not resolve its disputes peacefully, but this has compelled Asian countries to cooperate with the United States, maintaining bilateral alliances that together form a strong security architecture and limit China's room to maneuver. The strongest arguments made by those warning of Chinese influence revolve around economic policy. The list of complaints includes a host of Chinese policies, from intellectual property theft and currency manipulation to economic espionage and domestic subsidies. Yet none of those is likely to lead to direct conflict with the United States beyond the competition inherent in international trade, which does not produce zero-sum outcomes and is constrained by dispute-resolution mechanisms, such as those of the World Trade Organization. If anything, China's export-driven economic strategy, along with its large reserves of U.S. Treasury bonds, suggests that Beijing will continue to prefer a strong United States to a weak one.

#### Plans attempt to increase US power kills relations with China- viewed as aggressive containment

**Friedberg 11** (July/August, Aaron L., professor of politics and international affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics, The National Interest, lexis)

But the mistrust between Washington and Beijing is not a one-way street—and with good reason. China’s current rulers do not see themselves as they once did, as the leaders of a global revolutionary movement, yet they do believe that they are engaged in an ideological struggle, albeit one in which, until very recently, they have been almost entirely on the defensive. While they regard Washington’s professions of concern for human rights and individual liberties as cynical and opportunistic, China’s leaders do not doubt that the United States is motivated by genuine ideological fervor. As seen from Beijing, Washington is a dangerous, crusading, liberal, quasi-imperialist power that will not rest until it imposes its views and its way of life on the entire planet. Anyone who does not grasp this need only read the speeches of U.S. officials, with their promises to enlarge the sphere of democracy and rid the world of tyranny. In fact, because ideology inclines the United States to be more suspicious and hostile toward China than it would be for strategic reasons alone, it also tends to reinforce Washington’s willingness to help other democracies that feel threatened by Chinese power, even if this is not what a pure realpolitik calculation of its interests might seem to demand. Thus the persistence—indeed the deepening—of American support for Taiwan during the 1990s cannot be explained without reference to the fact that the island was evolving from an authoritarian bastion of anti-Communism to a liberal democracy. Severing the last U.S. ties to Taipei would remove a major source of friction with China and a potential cause of war. Such a move might even be conceivable if Taiwan still appeared to many Americans as it did in the 1970s, as an oppressive, corrupt dictatorship. But the fact that Taiwan is now seen as a genuine (if flawed) democracy will make it extremely difficult for Washington to ever willingly cut it adrift. Having watched America topple the Soviet Union through a combination of confrontation and subversion, since the end of the Cold War China’s strategists have feared that Washington intends to do the same to them. This belief colors Beijing’s perceptions of virtually every aspect of U.S. policy toward it, from enthusiasm for economic engagement to efforts to encourage the development of China’s legal system. It also shapes the leadership’s assessments of America’s activities across Asia, which Beijing believes are aimed at encircling it with pro-U.S. democracies, and informs China’s own policies to counter that influence.